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Abstract
Ethical decision-making frameworks assist in identifying the issues at stake in a
particular setting and thinking through, in a methodical manner, the ethical issues
that require consideration as well as the values that need to be considered and
promoted. Decisions made about the use, sharing, and re-use of big data are
complex and laden with values. This paper sets out an Ethics Framework for Big
Data in Health and Research developed by a working group convened by the
Science, Health and Policy-relevant Ethics in Singapore (SHAPES) Initiative. It
presents the aim and rationale for this framework supported by the underlying
ethical concerns that relate to all health and research contexts. It also describes a
set of substantive and procedural values that can be weighed up in addressing
these concerns, and a step-by-step process for identifying, considering, and
resolving the ethical issues arising from big data uses in health and research.
This Framework is subsequently applied in the papers published in this Special
Issue. These papers each address one of six domains where big data is currently
employed: openness in big data and data repositories, precision medicine and big
data, real-world data to generate evidence about healthcare interventions, AI-
assisted decision-making in healthcare, public-private partnerships in healthcare
and research, and cross-sectoral big data.
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Background
The use, sharing, and re-use of big data is a defining feature of the current health
and research landscape. A number of technological developments, such as artificial
intelligence, to give one example, can only advance with the use of big data. While
much has been written about the ethics of big data in a variety of contexts, there is
little guidance around which values are at stake and how we should make decisions
in an increasingly complex health and research environment. This paper proposes
an Ethics Framework for Big Data in Health and Research (hereafter Framework)
and provides insight into the values that are often central to decisions made in a
number of contexts where big data is used. The development of the Framework has
arisen from an international collaborative effort, a working group convened by the
Science, Health and Policy-relevant Ethics in Singapore (SHAPES) Initiative.
Throughout the drafting process of the Framework, the international working group
(SHAPES Working Group) has benefitted from input from a number of experts in
Singapore and around the world.
Definitions and Scope of the Framework
The Nature of ‘Big Data’
Big data is increasingly used in many different sectors from financial services, to
security, and law enforcement. Our work focuses on how big data is used in health
and research contexts. Some of these contexts will look familiar to those in public
health and epidemiology, as they handle very large data sets from a variety of
sources and sometimes in real time. However, big data uses are going well beyond
these traditional contexts, especially with the emergence of immense online repos-
itories and technologies, such as artificial intelligence (as discussed in this Special
Issue), transforming how data is stored, accessed, and shared in health and research
contexts.
The term ‘big data’ has been defined by a number of scholars, practitioners, and
policymakers in various ways but there are key characteristics of big data that exist
across these different accounts. We will not attempt to provide our own definition of
‘big data’ here; we will focus instead on key characteristics frequently associated
with the term, all of which point to its complexity (Baro et al. 2015). These
characteristics have been articulated in terms of the following:
& ‘3 Vs’ (volume, variety, velocity);
& ‘4 Vs’ (volume, variety, velocity, variability);
& ‘6 Vs’ (volume, variety, velocity, variability, veracity, value); and
& ‘7 Vs’ (volume, variety, velocity, variability, veracity, value, visualisation)
(Sivarajah et al. 2017).
In this work, we have focused on core characteristics considered by all, i.e. volume,
variety, and velocity (Box 1). In subsequent sections, it will become clear how these
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characteristics raise particular ethical challenges when big data is generated, used,
and shared in the context of health and research.
These characteristics go beyond how given datasets are being used at present
and point towards how they may potentially be used in the future. That potential,
even if not presently realised, is ethically relevant insofar as it raises questions
about how to manage and govern big data and data that may potentially become
big data. Such considerations will enable the eventual realisation of that great
potential to occur in a responsible and ethically defensible manner.
The foreseeable benefits of exploiting big data in health and research are
varied and hold the promise of being transformative. In the healthcare sector
alone, the benefits range from infrastructural, operational, organisational, mana-
gerial, and strategic which ultimately translate into improved treatments, more
efficient service delivery, and cost savings for healthcare organisations (Wang
et al. 2018). An example of operational benefits that would impact on patients
directly is the improvement of the quality and accuracy of clinical decisions
(Wang et al. 2018).
While the potential arising from big data in all fields, including health and
research, is widely recognised, so too are the numerous challenges that big data
poses. These challenges have been identified as relating to the characteristics of
big data (data challenges); issues around capturing, integrating, transforming,
analysing, and interpreting big data (process challenges); and around addressing
privacy concerns, data security, governance, and data sharing, as well as
operational and ownership issues (management challenges) (Sivarajah et al.
2017). The Framework we have developed primarily focuses on management
challenges but we acknowledge that these sets of challenges inevitably influ-
ence each other.
Defining ‘Health’ and ‘Research’
It is useful to make clear which specific contexts our Framework focuses on
by providing definitions for health and research. By ‘health’, we mean sys-
tems or fields whose primary aim is the maintenance or restoration of our
physical and mental condition and wellbeing. This extends to clinical medi-
cine, epidemiology, and public health. When we talk about ‘research’, we refer
to any systematic investigation with the intention of generating or contributing
Box 1 Key characteristics of ‘big data’
Volume: The sheer quantity of data, taking into account the number of persons whose data is contained in
given datasets and the level of detail about each individual.
Variety: The substantial diversity of data forms about individuals (e.g. structured, unstructured, images, audio)
as well as the diversity of sources for that data (e.g. scientific data, user-generated data, web data).
Velocity: The great speed at which data can be transmitted and analysed.
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to generalisable knowledge. Specifically, we will focus on research activities
that are of relevance to health, understood to also extend to wellbeing and
welfare. Even though we provide discrete definitions, we acknowledge the
blurring of boundaries between research and treatment (Kass et al. 2013),
which impacts on our definition of ‘health’.
What is an Ethical Decision-making Framework?
This Framework is a tool for deliberating about issues related to big data by
bringing to the fore relevant values which guide or ‘frame’ decision-making
(Dawson 2010). The Framework is neither a theory that helps justify actions1 nor
a model that provides a simplified means of understanding a complex issue,
although it can be linked to theories and explanations embedded within it
(Dawson 2010). Characteristics of a good decision-making framework, as described
in (Dawson 2010), include the following:
& It articulates its aim and scope
& It is practical
& It makes the values at stake explicit. As a starting point, the values are considered to
be of equal weight (i.e. no value always has greater priority than another) and they
guide decision-making2
& It is flexible, i.e. it does not force any particular kind of decision
& It is problem-driven rather than theory-driven, i.e. it is intended to address real-
world dilemmas and quandaries rather than to explore theoretical positions
& It provides explicit guidance on what kinds of issues to consider through a
structured series of questions.
Points to consider regarding the use of frameworks include:
& Frameworks do not provide the answer to particular questions; rather, they help us
think through the issue(s) and arrive at an answer, which may, in fact, require
further consideration.
& If there are underlying assumptions that implicitly give priority to a value, a
framework can reinforce certain positions rather than being genuinely explor-
atory of all relevant values (Dawson 2010; Grill and Dawson 2017). This
distinguishes ethical decision-making frameworks from legislative and regula-
tory frameworks, which prioritise certain values and articulate resulting
obligations.
& Ethical decision-making frameworks often allude to or incorporate a deliberative
balancing process to help work-through tensions between conflicting values.
1 However, decisions and actions are justified as part of the deliberative decision-making process.
2 A framework may, however, be guided by overarching considerations such as the need to respect persons, to
take account of community expectations, and to consider issues of vulnerability which can arise in uses of big
data, as is the case in this Framework.
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It is important to remember that the use of frameworks still requires personal and
general wisdom in decision-making. Personal and general wisdom incorporate
features such as deep insight, sound judgement, acknowledgment, and tolerance
of uncertainty, as well as a balanced outlook on solutions (Staudinger 2013;
Staudinger and Glück 2011). Deliberation of this kind also requires the exercise
of personal discretion.
Rationale, Aims, and Audience
The Need for an Ethics Framework for Big Data in Health and Research
Several complex ethical issues arise in considering and making decisions about uses
of big data. Although some of these issues are also present in more conventional
data ecosystems, they are either more acute in the context of big data, and/or
traditional means of addressing these issues are no longer fit for purpose. In the
subsequent two sections, we articulate what we take to be key issues.
Inability to Rely Solely on Data Masking Techniques and De-identification
The issue of anonymisation3 has become highly technical and care needs to be taken
when making claims about the associated risks or lack thereof, especially because
of rapid developments in data science and the different thresholds for considering
data ‘anonymised’ given the various techniques available. In many jurisdictions,
there remains a bright regulatory line between ‘identifiable4’ and ‘anonymised’
data, ‘de-identified’ data or data that has undergone ‘pseudonymisation’.5 However,
the dynamic and multifaceted nature of big data, as well as the variety of data
available, has increased the likelihood of privacy threats to data sets that are not
readily identifiable. There is increased risk of (re)identification of individuals and/
or a weakening of the security that data masking techniques appear to provide.
Three kinds of disclosure risks may lead to the re-identification of an individual
despite the masking or de-identification of identifiable data:
& identity disclosure—when data is successfully associated with person X;
& attribute disclosure—one such disclosure is made when person X is identified as
belonging to a particular group, e.g. cancer registry, so there is membership
disclosure; and
3 “In general, anonymisation refers to the process of removing identifying information such that the remaining
data cannot be used to identify any particular individual…Data would not be considered anonymised if there is
a serious possibility that an individual could be re-identified, taking into consideration both: (a) the data itself,
or the data combined with other information to which the organisation has or is likely to have access and (b)
the measures and safeguards (or lack thereof) implemented by the organisation to mitigate the risk of
identification.” (Personal Data Protection Commission Singapore 2018)
4 Information “that may reasonably be expected to identify an individual, alone or in combination with other
data.” (Global Alliance for Genomics and Health 2015)
5 For example, in the US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (2004) Security Rule; the EU
General Data Protection Regulation (2016/679); and Singapore’s Personal Data Protection Act (2012).
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& inferential disclosure—when information about person X can be inferred with high
confidence with released data (Templ 2017).
Disclosure risks can only ever be completely eliminated if data is not shared at
all. Privacy models take into account the attributes of a dataset (as well as
specific ‘attacker’ models) and specify the conditions that the data must satisfy
in order for the disclosure risk to be minimised to an acceptable risk level6
(Soria-Comas and Domingo-Ferrer 2016). However, for the reasons given above,
the anonymisation of data with the aid of privacy models is not perfect because
these models were originally developed for static data sets rather than for use in
the big data environment (Domingo-Ferrer and Soria-Comas 2016). There have
been concerted efforts in recent years to identify what properties a privacy model
should display to ensure that the privacy of data contributors is adequately
protected while at the same time ensuring that data is not rendered useless as
a result of privacy protection efforts. Although not an exhaustive list, three
desirable properties that a privacy model for big data should display include:
& data linkability—i.e. the ability for anonymised data to remain relatively linkable so
the value of the data is not significantly diminished;
& composability—this relates to the privacy guarantees that can be given when
data from multiple sources (to which the same or different privacy models have
been applied) is integrated into one data-rich source (i.e. fused); and
& low computation—this relates to algorithmic efficiency, i.e. the algorithm uses a
low number of computational resources, such as time or space (Domingo-Ferrer
and Soria-Comas 2016).
Despite such efforts, technical measures to protect individuals’ interests and rights,
such as anonymisation, continue to be challenged or even rendered redundant with
many big data initiatives (Domingo-Ferrer and Soria-Comas 2016).
Diminishing Key Role of Informed Consent
A traditional and heavily relied on requirement for including individuals in research
or other health-related activities has been informed consent. This standard is
essentially an individuals’ agreement to assume the potential risk(s) involved in
participating in the research or health activity. Heavy reliance on consent is becom-
ing increasingly impracticable in the big data context because data might be linked
and used within and across ecosystems that are far removed from the original source
of information. While individuals might be re-contactable in some cases, it might
still not be possible to inform them fully of the range of uses to which their data
6 As one of the experts we consulted pointed out, even if there is no re-identification risk present, individuals
whose data is used in a non-identifiable manner (as well as others who share the same group membership) may
nevertheless be impacted adversely by its use, as a result of decisions made based on the use of the data (e.g.
policy decisions).
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might be put by multiple users across countless ecosystems. The sheer size of
participant involvement, the funding limitations, and the limited research
timeframes imposed by funders also impose pragmatic limitations on re-
contacting participants. In such circumstances, it is important to explore alternative
ethically acceptable approaches and mechanisms which provide appropriate pro-
tections for individuals whose data may be used. This Framework takes into
account these and other relevant and emerging issues.
Aims of the Framework
The aim of this Framework is to examine the nature of the ethical issues raised by
big data in health and research by identifying and bringing to the fore key under-
lying values and providing a step-by-step approach to thinking through the issues
(Box 2).
Intended audience
The target audience of this Framework includes anyone who is accountable for big
data in health and research. Specifically, the Framework is intended to be of
relevance to:
1. Biomedical researchers, clinician-researchers, and data scientists;
2. Policymakers and those involved in governance of big data activities in health and
research (including ethics committees and data access committees);
3. Data controllers with legal responsibilities for the safe and secure processing of
personal data.
Beyond these three core groups, the Framework is also intended to be a helpful
resource for academics and healthcare providers interested in thinking about and
Box 2 Purpose of the Framework
This Framework aims to
1. support decision-makers in identifying values relating to a range of big data uses, such as sharing, linkage,
granting access to third parties
2. provide decision-makers with examples of a balancing approach to weighing up the relevant values when
making decisions about big data; and
3. demonstrate how decision-makers can be more robust and transparent in their decision-making, thereby
better equipping them to justify their decisions about the use and sharing of big data.
This Framework does not aim to
1. provide a single set of standard issues or concepts relevant to all big data activities, as these may differ
considerably; or
2. provide a single solution for specific issues that arise in big data activities.
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discussing ethical issues surrounding big data as well as patients, research participants,
and lay people with an interest in this topic.
Framework Structure
The Framework highlights key ethical values underlying a variety of big data activities.
These values encompass nine substantive and seven procedural values that apply in big data
activities.7 With a focus on these underlying values, the Framework provides ethical
guidance on how key stakeholders in big data can think through issues to come to a decision
in a number of domains where big data is used or shared. An important part of this process
involves identifying and giving due consideration to all the relevant issues, identifying the
relevant values, and weighing up values which appear to be in conflict with each other.
Assisting with this process is a step-by-step guide, which articulates a structured decision-
making process, and which is central to many decision-making frameworks. The value of
this step-by-step approach is that it focuses decision-makers’ attention on the fact that a
range of issues and values needs to be considered and prompts them to more thoroughly
justify choices made, particularly where conflicting values are at play. The Framework is
flexible enough to support decision-making across a diversity of big data activities.
The Framework is novel because it explores six key domains of big data in health
and research in which underlying substantive and procedural values are examined in
detail. These domains cover:
1. Openness in big data and data repositories (Xafis and Labude 2019)
2. Precision medicine and big data (Schaefer et al. 2019)
3. Real-world data to generate evidence about healthcare interventions (Lipworth
2019)
4. AI-assisted decision-making in healthcare (Lysaght et al. 2019)
5. Big data and public-private partnerships in healthcare and research (Ballantyne
and Stewart 2019)
6. Cross-sectoral big data (Laurie 2019).
The articulation of issues specific to each domain enabled the identification of relevant
values and subsequent analyses and balancing of competing values in a practical work-
through fashion. It was not feasible to consider every possible issue pertinent to each
domain. We therefore selected a subset of relevant issues and, for each issue, a subset of
relevant values that need to be considered when engaging in moral reasoning to
illustrate how the process works.
The domains have been designed to complement each other so that when read as a
collective, they will cover a range of issues and articulate a number of values relevant to
big data in health and research. In other words, while the domains can be read
separately to explore some of the issues affecting a particular sector, there is benefit
7 We have selected the values we considered most pertinent to big data but other values may also be relevant
depending on the specific context within which ethical issues are being considered. There are also aspects of
decision-making, such as efficiency, economy, and practicability, which although significant considerations in
decision-making, are not considered to be ethical values and have not been discussed here. We acknowledge,
however, that they should always be considered in such decision-making.
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to be had from reading them together to get a broader view of the range of issues and
values in operation across a range of data ecosystems.
The Framework sits within a context of broader issues that relate to and influence all
decisions in big data, irrespective of the specific domain. These overarching ethical
issues are respect for persons, positive community expectations known as ‘social
licence’, and vulnerabilities and power.
Three Overarching Ethical Issues
The section below provides a very brief account of issues that are central to the
consideration of all domains in which big data is used. The section briefly discusses
the concepts of ‘respect for persons’ and ‘social licence’ and describes the relationship
between the two because this may not be readily evident. The examples help to elucidate
the centrality of respect for persons and social licence in the big data context. The section
also explores in depth the concept of vulnerability in the context of big data.
Respect for Persons and Its Relationship to Social Licence
Respect for persons relates to one’s moral attitude towards others and the actions
towards others that result from and exemplify this attitude. This moral attitude can
entail both actions and omissions and can be displayed by individuals, groups, or
institutions. We have not listed respect for persons as a specific value in this Frame-
work. This is because it underpins and/or is intertwined with many of the values we
have identified.
A thorough understanding of the concept of respect for persons requires us to be
specific about what respect entails, who is entitled to respect, and what limits (if any) of
respect might be justified. Historically, respect for persons has always been associated
with acknowledging and respecting individuals’ autonomy (Lysaught 2004) but the
concept of respect for persons is controversial, primarily because of debates about who
counts as a ‘person’. We do not attempt to resolve these debates here but do want to
clarify how we use the concept in the Framework. We endorse a broad conception of
respect for persons that can accommodate a variety of cultural norms, including those
which place less emphasis on individual autonomy and autonomous decision-making
than is the norm in some cultures.
Understanding how exactly respect for persons manifests itself in the big data context
and what it entails may, at first glance, appear elusive. Respect for persons is demonstrated
in the moral stance or attitude we adopt towards individuals or groups and can be
powerfully conveyed through communication. Likewise, a failure to communicate may
be perceived as conveying a lack of respect for persons. We therefore need to examine
communication in the context of big data further and link the concept of respect for persons
to social licence.
Key to any relationship underpinned by respect is the establishment of a ‘conversa-
tion’ where participants have equal opportunity to engage with one another in a
transparent and collaborative manner. The availability of reliable and digestible
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information on big data in health and research underlies any meaningful interaction that
professionals, communities, and governments may hope to establish with publics.8
Transparent information on how big data is regulated, the protections in place for
individuals whose data may be used, as well as the potential risks, the governance
mechanisms adopted, clear accountability pathways, and clarity of the public benefits
arising from such uses of health data are all essential elements of one side of the
‘conversation’ with publics. A further critical display of respect includes engaging with
publics to understand and consider their views, concerns, and expectations in relation
to uses of big data, including both aggregate and individual level health data. It is
through such respectful interactions that public trust is built and ultimately secured, as a
result of bodies/agencies being viewed as trustworthy.
The domain paper on Big Data and Public-Private Partnerships in Healthcare and
Research (Ballantyne and Stewart 2019) discusses the destructive effects of deploying
big data programmes without adequate clear information, consultation, or public
engagement, even if the legal frameworks within which they are designed are sound
(Carter et al. 2015; van Staa et al. 2016). To be truly respectful, such public interaction
needs to take place not simply to ward off public backlash but as a matter of priority at
the outset of new developments or programmes. Such was the approach adopted in the
Scottish Health Informatics Programme (www.scot-ship.ac.uk/about.html), a Scotland-
wide electronic patient records programme that has enjoyed great public support. The
conversation needs to be ongoing and genuine in intent so as not to breach the public’s
trust, as has been the case where public messaging lacks clarity and where public
engagement has been insufficient.
Positive public expectations associated with the perceived legitimacy of activ-
ities that have broad societal impacts are referred to as ‘social licence’. We can
find out whether a public is likely to accept or oppose data activities via research,
public engagement activities such as citizens’ juries and focus groups, citizen
responses to media releases, and social media such as Twitter. The expectations of
publics regarding the acceptability of big data activities are heavily influenced by
the level of engagement with publics and appropriate information dissemination
(Hill et al. 2013).
In the previous section ‘Diminishing Key Role of Informed Consent’, we discussed
the role of informed consent as the key mechanism for securing agreement for
secondary uses of health data in research and other big data activities. Respecting
persons entails not making generalised assumptions about social licence for the use of
health data without consent. Equally, however, it entails not making generalised
assumptions about social licence even where consent has been obtained from
individuals.
Social licence depends on the specific context for a data activity (Xafis 2015), the
partners involved, and local cultural norms. This is partly what makes cross-sectoral
data sharing and public-private partnerships challenging. Therefore, beyond the broad
8 Away in which the Framework uses ‘public’ is as a noun, where it refers to the community of citizens. This
sense of public is often invoked as a target audience for public engagement by policy makers. However,
relying on this singular understanding of ‘the public’ has its drawbacks: it suggests that there is a represen-
tative public with internally consistent views about and attitudes towards a subject matter. A more nuanced
picture may instead invoke the notion of multiple ‘publics’, with diverging levels of background knowledge
and prior levels of engagement on the subject matter.
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dissemination of information and public engagement concerning big data, it may be
that similar local efforts need to be made to ensure that uses of big data cohere with
public expectations and values. This is a process central to any big data activity and
needs to occur throughout the data activity, especially given the rapidly changing data
ecosystem. Box 3 summarises key points to remember about respect for persons and
social licence.
Vulnerabilities and Power in Big Data
A theme running through all of the domains in this Framework is that agents may be
vulnerable to harms and/or wrongs that arise through the use of big data in health and
research. In this section, we explore the ways in which activities using big data can
create, exacerbate, or mitigate vulnerabilities. An important first step is to clarify what
is meant by ‘vulnerability’.
The Nature of Vulnerability
In the most basic sense, vulnerability means susceptibility to harm or wrong, be that
physical, social, or economic; it may be a characteristic of individuals or groups. It may
be considered a characteristic of any human life, since we are all vulnerable to harms or
wrongs of one sort or another. Yet this reflects neither how ‘vulnerability’ is used in
everyday language, nor its moral importance: as Rogers has suggested, a wide defini-
tion of vulnerability ‘obscures rather than enables the identification of the context-
specific needs of particular groups’ (Rogers et al. 2012). Meanwhile, Henk ten Have
suggests that ‘[w]hat makes vulnerability problematic is the possibility of abuse and
exploitation’ (ten Have 2016). This helps explain why the Declaration of Helsinki,
which sets out the standard principles that govern medical research on humans, states
that ‘[s]ome groups and individuals are particularly vulnerable and may have an
increased likelihood of being wronged or of incurring additional harm’ (World Medical
Association 2013).
Box 3 Key points about respect for persons and social licence
1. Respect for persons is a moral attitude that individuals, groups, or institutions hold and display towards
others.
2. Social licence relates to the positive public expectations associated with the perceived legitimacy of
activities that have broad societal impacts and it also relates closely to trust, which, in turn, is enhanced via
open, transparent communication.
3. The level of respect we hold towards others is often evident through interpersonal communication.
4. Showing respect towards publics in relation to the use of big data entails engaging in a variety of
communicative exchanges to share information about big data activities and to receive input from publics.
5. Engaging with publics in such a way is a process that should be ongoing if public trust is to be promoted and
achieved.
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For the sake of this document, we understand ‘vulnerability’ to mean an elevated
susceptibility to systemic disadvantage, or a diminished opportunity for flourishing, arising
from a physical, psychological, or social contingency. Correspondingly, the vulnerable are
at an elevated risk of harm or wrong arising from such contingencies. It is important to keep
in mind throughout that ‘vulnerability’ is likely to be context-specific, in that a person may
be vulnerable in a certain way in situation A, but not in B, and vice versa. As Luna has
argued, it may be less fruitful to think of a person as being vulnerable, than to think of them
as being in a situation that renders them vulnerable; ‘[i]f the situation changes, the person
may no longer be considered vulnerable’ (Luna 2009).
Given this, it is possible to identify a reasonably clear ‘family’ of more specific
senses in which the word might be used.9At the most fundamental, inherent vulnera-
bility is a feature of all human life: each of us is inherently vulnerable to illness, for
example. However, as we have already indicated, to use the word in this way may
be over-inclusive, and diminish its power to bring particular moral needs to light;
and so it is useful to refine the concept so that it is sensitive to the contexts in
which agents exist. To take an example relevant to this Framework, each of us is
vulnerable to the (mis)use of data; this vulnerability is a function of the particular
details of the information ‘ecosystem’ in which we live and our place within it,
though, and so is situational rather than inherent. In addition, vulnerability may be
more or less enduring; our vulnerability to the (mis)use of data may be magnified
in some situations.
A person may be vulnerable to something, even if it never has any effect on their
day-to-day life. For example, a participant in a pharmaceutical trial is vulnerable
because the precise effects of the drug are unknown, but good regulation and monitor-
ing will reduce the likelihood that the person is harmed. Likewise, anyone about whom
data is gathered is vulnerable to the possibility of a data-breach, but that layer of
vulnerability can be minimised through robust data-handling procedures. For some
commentators, this speaks to a distinction between occurrent and dispositional vulner-
ability, where the former brings a risk of harm in the present, and the latter brings a
similar risk in future. However, this distinction may not be all that useful, since
‘vulnerability’ implies susceptibility to harm or wrong; there is no timescale in this,
and if a harm or wrong is present, then the object of our moral concern is no longer
vulnerable: she is actually being harmed or wronged.10
Finally, vulnerability may be pathogenic. Pathogenic vulnerabilities ‘may be
generated by a variety of sources, including morally dysfunctional or abusive
interpersonal and social relationships and socio-political oppression or injustice’
(Rogers et al. 2012). For example, a patriarchal social structure can generate
vulnerability. In another context, economic injustice may increase the vulnerability
of certain groups to exploitative practices: for example, it is possible that the
consent of would-be research participants is unreliable if participation represents
their only realistic access to any medical treatment at all. In respect of big data, there
may be a pathogenic aspect to vulnerability if an agent’s inability to control how
information about him/her is used is related to the political or legal norms that apply
to him/her.
9 Despite some differences, this taxonomy is informed by (Mackenzie et al. 2014).
10 Our thanks are owed to one of the peer reviewers for making this useful point.
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Different kinds of vulnerability may often be found together, and vulnerability in one
respect might be a factor in generating vulnerability in another under certain conditions.
Vulnerability is also linked to a person’s relationship with other people and institutions
and can therefore be analysed in terms of agents’ relative power—economic, political, or
intellectual—over their own or others’ lives (Zion et al. 2000). Some relationships may
reduce vulnerability; others may generate or exacerbate it. Perplexingly, vulnerabilities
can be created or exacerbated by attempts to mitigate other vulnerabilities. Lange offers
the example of a research protocol that excludes pregnant women, noting that
[w]hile the intent is to protect the woman and her fetus, the unintended effect is a
lack of medications that have been adequately tested and approved for use during
pregnancy. This lack in turn increases the vulnerability of all pregnant women
(Lange et al. 2013; Dodds 2008).
Similar concerns might be raised in other contexts. Imagine that researchers are working
on a treatment for a disease that is mainly found among the world’s poorest, and need to
carry out trials involving them. While there are legitimate worries about exploitation,
overplaying them may have the paradoxical effect of delaying research into the disease,
thereby entrenching another vulnerability. To push the example further, research into
rare diseases may be much easier if medical records and other relevant information from
a range of sources can be collated; this is an archetypal use of big data. But such collation
may bring the risk of de-anonymisation; the question to be addressed would be one of
whether that risk is so great as to warrant abandoning the research: it might not be. In
other words, it is not enough to say that we should be concerned by vulnerability, since
vulnerability may take several forms and be difficult to avoid.
Vulnerability, then, is a multi-dimensional thing. A set of actions may increase
vulnerability in some senses, while at the same time mitigating it in others. It may
not be something that can be eliminated. What we can do, however, is be cognisant of
its forms, and strive to attenuate it where possible. Where it is not possible to attenuate
vulnerability, there will be a need to decide whether the research is justified, given the
nature and scale of the harms and wrongs faced by the data subjects. There is unlikely
to be a simple formula for making such assessments.
Vulnerability, Health Research, and Big Data
Control of information from health research that uses big data represents one of the
clearest problems for mitigating vulnerability. Data is generated on anyone registered in
a health system, and on anyone who has participated in research; it is also gathered in
non-health settings—say, derived from internet browsing histories, from online pur-
chases, or from personal fitness or sleep-monitoring devices. These databases might be
accessed and linked to draw health-related inferences. Clearly, almost everyone is
vulnerable to a breach of privacy arising from this; weak regulatory oversight will
exacerbate that vulnerability. Moreover, bodies with a commercial interest in selling
health-related goods and services may be able to use shared data to pressure people into
purchasing them: susceptibility to such pressure is itself a kind of vulnerability to
outside influence. This point is touched on in the Domain paper AI-assisted Decision-
Making in Healthcare (Lysaght et al. 2019). Additionally, certain groups or their
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members may be vulnerable to unwanted interference by the government or other
bodies that is informed by inferences from big data analysis. If the government in
question is benign, the harms arising from this may be small, but not all governments
are benign. The harms and wrongs arising from breaches of privacy or even simple
lapses in its protection are further magnified if the inferences drawn from data are
inaccurate.
It is also important to remember that big data research can generate significant
benefits, and forswearing certain data sources can raise its own problems. Discov-
ering a correlation between an illness and some hitherto unexpected feature of
sufferers’ lives can help with diagnosis, and may be an important part of generating
a treatment, thereby mitigating a particular vulnerability. An under-researched
group may not be properly represented in databases, potentially exposing members
to harm or, at best, meaning that they miss out on benefits—another manifestation
of vulnerability; processing data from a range of sources may allow researchers to
develop treatments for certain illnesses, or public health strategies to reduce their
occurrence in the first place.
Thinking clearly about vulnerability in the context of big data will not mean that the
problems will go away, and that is not what we intend here. As we have seen,
vulnerability is inevitable and will be a feature of any social interaction. However,
the key message here is that by being aware of how vulnerabilities might manifest, it
ought to be easier to mitigate their undesirable effects.
Issues of Vulnerability in Big Data Research
In this section, we will look at three vulnerability-related issues raised by big data-based
research. These three issues are not the only ones where vulnerability is important, but
they ought to give a sense of the problems that researchers may face, and of strategies
that may be adopted, and will therefore inform other examples.
1. The big data divide, which is a term describing the situation in which the benefits
arising from the collection and use of big data are not evenly shared.
2. Group harms, which is a term that describes the possible harms to the collective
interests of a community arising from the use and misuse of big data.
3. Co-governance, which is a consideration that may ameliorate some of the problems
raised by concerns about the big data divide and the possibility of group harms and
wrongs by ensuring that all stakeholders have a say in decision-making over how
data are gathered, stored, and distributed.
The Big Data Divide
The big data divide marks a difference between ‘sorters and sortees’ (Andrejevic
2014): those who control, generate, or purchase access to large databases, and those
who merely feature in them. The divide is potentially very wide—and possibly
widening, because of the ubiquity of electronic devices: the bigger a person’s online
presence, the more data will be generated; and the bigger the databank, the more power
accrues to those who have access to the data. Mittelstadt and Floridi talk about ‘data
subjects [being] in a disempowered state, faced with seemingly insurmountable barriers
to understanding who holds what data about them, being used for which purposes’
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(Mittelstadt and Floridi 2016). One concern is that those who are already in the most
vulnerable social positions are likely to be among those most vulnerable to data use and
misuse, yet also among those least able to do anything about it.
Uneven access to data (and to its benefits) is not necessarily unjust, but it might be
unjust if that unevenness would not have arisen but for one party’s vulnerability, or if it
results in vulnerabilities being exploited; it may not harm anyone, but it may prevent
certain benefits accruing to those in need. Addressing the big data divide therefore
requires that we engage with questions about justice, and about solidarity—particularly
with those who are most vulnerable. Themes of justice and solidarity will recur
throughout the Framework.
Group Harms
Vulnerability may be a characteristic of individuals or of groups. The everyday
understanding of the word can accommodate this easily: it is not unusual to talk of
cultures, communities, or the environment as vulnerable. Harms may accrue to
individuals insofar as that they are members of a group, or to the group as a whole.
However, harms to groups do not always mean that individual members are harmed.
For example, if an Amazonian tribe is shrinking as its members assimilate into
urban culture, we might say that it is vulnerable even if every individual member is
flourishing. Generally, we should keep in mind that while it may be useful to talk of
‘vulnerable groups’, not every member of such groups will be vulnerable, vulner-
able in the same way, or vulnerable only in the way that the group is; it would be a
mistake to treat one as a perfect representative of the other (Luna 2009). In this
light, the CIOMS International Ethical Guidelines for Health-related Research
Involving Humans warn against treating ‘entire classes of individuals’ as vulnera-
ble, though concede that ‘circumstances exist that require research ethics commit-
tees to pay special attention to research involving certain groups’ (Council for
International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) 2016).
There may be several ways in which considering group vulnerability may inform
decision-making in health research. It might be that members of vulnerable groups
are pressured into participation in research, and that the data generated are misused
in a way that disadvantages that group. For example, the discovery that there is a
link between a certain gene and a certain illness may impact on the lives of people
who are identified as carrying that gene, irrespective of whether the illness ever
manifests. This impact may be economic (relating to things like the cost of
insurance), or socially stigmatising. Questions about who has the power to deter-
mine what happens to data are worth asking—questions that we shall also raise in
respect of co-governance.
Another important point is that big data gives rise to a growing potential for re-
identification of what was thought to be anonymised data, as discussed in a previous
section on the Diminishing Key Role of Informed Consent. This may put individuals at
an elevated risk of being harmed or wronged.
Equally, big data use might help ameliorate or avert group harms. Consider again
the historical exclusion of pregnant women from medical trials, often for the sake of
admirable concerns about the vulnerability both of the woman and of the embryo.
US federal regulations for the protection of human research subjects stipulate that
research involving pregnant women is permitted only if it ‘hold[s] out the prospect
Asian Bioethics Review (2019) 11:227–254 241
of direct benefit for the woman or the fetus; or, if there is no such prospect of
benefit, the risk to the fetus is not greater than minimal and the purpose of the
research is the development of important biomedical knowledge which cannot be
obtained by any other means’ (Department of Health and Human Services 2017).
This has meant that there are gaps in our knowledge about how drugs affect around
half the people using them due to differences between the male and female physiology
and yet the drugsmay get administered to women all the same, not least in the time before
a woman knows that she is pregnant (Sinclair et al. 2016). Gathering real-world data
on any sequelae may therefore be the only available method of learning about
effectiveness and side effects, and therefore of ameliorating vulnerability (see for
example (Lipworth 2019)). As noted above, similar considerations may be applied
to research involving children, or on research into rare or ‘orphan’ diseases, for
which sweeps of large datasets may provide otherwise unavailable insights into
prevalence, aetiology, and possible treatment (Costa 2014; Pogue et al. 2018;
Austin and Gadhia 2017). However, for some problems that need to be addressed
with this notion, see (Halfmann et al. 2017).
One possible response is that governments should intervene on behalf of
constituent groups for which they have responsibility, and pass laws to protect
them from potential harms. Mexico, for example, has passed a law stipulating that
genetic data is property of the government; the use and export of data, particularly
when a patentable outcome is envisaged, therefore requires approval (Benjamin
2009; Séguin et al. 2008). Such legislation may be seen as an attempt to protect
vulnerable groups from exploitation by large and wealthy biotech companies: a
national government can shield minority groups. In this way, government and
people can exercise co-governance over data, facilitate a way for groups to
capitalise on their ‘own’ genetic resources, and reduce group harms, and tame
commercial imperatives. On the other hand, legislation like Mexico’s may be seen
as appropriating the rights of some groups to decide for themselves how to handle
data derived from their genes. It may diminish, not bolster, the authority of
peoples within the state.
There is no clear-cut position to be had on whether big data causes group harms, or
how any such harms should be addressed. Its use might exploit and exacerbate certain
group vulnerabilities, but might help us avoid others. It will therefore be important for
data managers to confront the complexity of the issues surrounding big data use. It
would also be important not to be irrationally optimistic about the benefits to be had; a
precautionary approach may be desirable.
Co-governance
Co-governance implies ‘[s]haring and allocating roles, funds, responsibilities
[and] powers’, and sharing in the formulation of the protocols for research
programmes (Jones et al. 2001). In respect of research using big data, it means a
system under which all stakeholders have the greatest possible say in how data
about them is gathered, stored, and disseminated. This would help minimise the
risks of, and arising from, violations of individuals’ privacy, group harms, and so
on. Finally, co-governance also means taking seriously the arguable right of those
biotech companies to have a say in how data is to be used and to a share of the
benefits, since they will be investing the capital.
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It is important to remember that co-governance is not a magic bullet: it will not make
vulnerabilities, or the associated harms and wrongs, go away. One difficulty is that
allowing all members of a group a say on how data are used will be impossible for any
but the smallest groups, and it may be unclear what to do if members of the group
disagree with each other. Appealing to the idea that a community may have represen-
tatives to speak on its behalf (Weijer 2006) simply changes the form of the problem:
what does it mean to be representative, or a representative, of a group? What happens if
there is a conflict of interests betweenmembers of the community and the community as
a whole?
Co-governance cannot always reconcile competing moral imperatives, and simply
appealing to co-governance will not tell us how to maintain due regard for data
subjects’ privacy while making datasets available to researchers when that is desirable,
granted that such maintenance is possible. Neither can it solve the problem of discov-
eries being made about participants without their ever knowing that a given question
was being asked.
Co-governance may therefore be an ideal rather than a reality. Nevertheless, ensur-
ing transparency and accountability in data use may ease some potential problems, and
shows respect for stakeholders even when ‘full’ co-governance is not possible. Box 4
summarises key points to remember about vulnerability and power in big data.
Key Ethical Values
The Working Group identified 16 ethical values as being particularly important in the
context of big data in health and research. It should be emphasised that this list of
values is not exhaustive and that stakeholders may have other values or commitments
that would be particularly important in certain contexts. This section provides an
explanation of how the Working Group understands these values within the context
of the Framework.
Competing Values
Although all of the values referred to in the Framework may be easily satisfied in
isolation, it will typically be impossible to simultaneously satisfy the demands
implied by all the values. For example, data sharing might serve the value of
public benefit but undermine privacy.
Box 4 Key points about vulnerability and power in big data
1. Vulnerability takes several forms.
2. Vulnerability is often contextual; a person may be vulnerable in one situation but not another.
3. Using big data in health research provides a way to relieve some vulnerabilities but it might generate or
exacerbate others.
4. Those handling big data should be aware of this, and consider ways in which possible harms and wrongs
may be mitigated or avoided entirely.
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In cases where values are in tension with each other, decision-makers will need to
judge which should take priority; the Framework cannot and does not include guidance
on how to prioritise them. It is important to note that judging the best course of action
will require more than comparing the length of the lists of values that would be satisfied
or violated by a course of action. Rather, it is necessary to make a case for either
compromising or privileging some values over others, and to put in place mechanisms to
minimise the potential harms and wrongs associated with any chosen course of action.
Substantive and Procedural Values
A broad distinction can be drawn between substantive and procedural values. Substan-
tive values are those considerations that should be realised through the outcome of a
decision. Procedural values are the values that guide the process of deliberation and
decision-making itself.
Though substantive and procedural values are distinct, there is an important relation-
ship between them in that procedural values may assist in realising certain substantive
values. For example, maintaining the procedural value of transparency can help promote
the substantive value of justice by allowing scrutiny from third parties who may be able
to point out potential research discrepancies.
Procedural values are especially important in cases where we can expect reasonable
people to disagree about which substantive values to prioritise. Current uses of big data
are likely to generate such debate. It is therefore important that procedural values guide
decision-making to ensure reasonable and defensible decisions are made in the face of a
plurality of views. To illustrate what we mean, we offer the following example: given
inescapable limits on resources, people might disagree about which healthcare needs
should be prioritised; this would be a disagreement about substance. However, they
might nevertheless agree on a fair rubric by which spending decisions should be taken
and the deadlock broken; this would be an agreement about procedure.
We do not offer a specific formula for when or how to use or prioritise
particular substantive or procedural values here. However, throughout the do-
main papers we offer many illustrative examples to show where and why
values might clash, and how these tensions could be successfully navigated.
There may be cases in which the distinction between procedural and substantive
values comes very close or begins to blur. In such cases, the distinction is less
important than it might be in others and decision-making should be focused on
the discussion and consideration of the values themselves.
The 16 Values
Listed in Tables 1 and 2 below are the substantive and procedural values identified as
relevant to big data in health and research with their definitions.
Process for Determining Key Values
The 16 substantive and procedural values listed in our Framework were adopted
after a process of critical reflection by members of the SHAPES Working Group.
The aim was to articulate a set of values that adequately capture the normative
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concepts that underpin ethical concerns surrounding big data in health and research.
These values needed to be general enough to cut across multiple domains of big
data use that are addressed in this Framework, but not so general as to blur together
distinct spheres of concern.
Initially, a larger list of values was identified during a full-day face-to-face research
meeting where detailed discussions were held. The SHAPES Working Group then
merged values that were redundant, and set aside those insufficiently relevant to the
issues raised by big data. The values were then classified as either substantive—
referring to those that should be realised through the outcome of a decision, or
Table 1 Substantive values relevant to big data contexts
Substantive value Definition
Harm
minimisation
Harm minimisation involves reducing the possibility of real or perceived harms (physical,
economic, psychological, emotional, or reputational) to persons.
Integrity Integrity refers to a feature or property of those acting in accordance with personal and/or
accepted scientific and professional values and commitments.
Justice Justice consists in treating individuals and groups fairly and with respect. This includes the
fair distribution of benefits and burdens of data activities (collection, storage, use,
linkage, and sharing) and attention to issues of equity.
Liberty/autonomy Liberty and autonomy are very closely related concepts. For the purpose of this document,
we define liberty as the state of not being coerced by physical, legal, or social pressure
into action by some outside influence. Autonomy is defined as the capacity of a person
or group to be self-determining.
Privacy1 For the purposes of this Framework, privacy refers to controlling access to information
about persons. Privacy is valuable because the ability to control access to information
about persons promotes certain core interests that we have as individuals and groups.
These are wide-ranging but include identity interests and the promotion of human
autonomous decision-making, as well as freedom from potential harms such as dis-
crimination and stigmatisation that may arise from our data being disclosed. This
control may be exercised directly by individuals to whom the data pertains, or by
designated persons, such as data custodians whose decisions aim to promote those core
individual and group interests.
Proportionality Proportionality is a consideration in decision-making that requires that the means are
necessary and appropriate in relation to the end that is being pursued, and being
cognisant of the competing interests at hand.
Public benefit Public benefit is the overall good that society as a whole receives from a given project.
This includes consideration of effects on wellbeing, distribution, societal cohesion,
human rights, and other sources of value to society. It may not be possible to measure
these factors by the same standards, so some judgement and critical analysis will be
required in determining what is publicly beneficial.
Solidarity Solidarity is the commitment among persons with recognised morally relevant sameness
or similarity to sharing costs and benefits for the good of a group, community, nation, or
global population.
Stewardship Stewardship reflects a relationship with things, such as data, to promote twin objectives of
taking care of the object of attention as well as seeking actively to promote its value and
utility. It involves guiding others with prudence and care across one or more
endeavours—without which there is risk of impairment or harm—and with a view to
collective betterment.
1 Confidentiality should be considered alongside any privacy consideration, where relevant. The obligation to
protect and promote the non-disclosure of information imparted in a relationship of trust lies at the core of the
concept of confidentiality
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procedural—referring to those which relate to ways we engage in human activities,
including decision-making.
The group did not intend to settle considerable debate in the literature concerning the
precise meaning of concepts like justice or privacy, but rather sought definitions that
were concise, comprehensible to non-expert stakeholders, and reflective of the core
ethical concerns raised by big data in health and research.
Applying the Values: a Deliberative Balancing Approach
to Decision-making
Within each of the six big data domains, we identified a set of relevant ethical issues
and a subset of values that would be appealed to when deliberating about the issues.
This is followed by a case study that illustrates how the values can be usefully deployed
in order to assess what actions could/should be taken in a given context, and how that
course of action can be justified.
While the case studies in the domain papers are not all identical in structure, they are
all premised on the understanding that values inevitably compete and conflict, and that
decision-makers need to judge which should take priority. This, as noted previously,
requires more than comparing the lists of values that would be satisfied or violated by a
course of action. Rather, it is necessary to provide justifications for either
Table 2 Procedural values relevant to big data contexts
Procedural
value
Definition
Accountability Accountability refers to the ability to scrutinise judgements, decisions and actions, and for
decision-makers to be held responsible for their consequences.
Consistency In the absence of relevant differences between two or more situations, consistency requires
that the same standards be applied across them. While consistency in decision-making
may be regarded as valuable in its own right, adherence to a practice of consistency may
help actors to secure other values, such as fairness and trustworthiness.
Engagement Engagement is the meaningful involvement of stakeholders in the design and conduct of the
data activities. Engagement goes beyond the dissemination of information and requires
that data activities have been influenced in some way by the views of stakeholders.
Reasonableness Reasonableness means appealing to reasons and values that are widely recognised as
relevant and fair.
Reflexivity Reflexivity refers to the process of reflecting on and responding to the limitations and
uncertainties embedded in knowledge, information, evidence, and data. This includes
being alert to competing and conflicting personal, professional, and organisational
interests and to the management of associated biases. Reflexive institutions revise or
create new policies and systems that change institutional processes and prompt further
reflection and response.
Transparency Transparency is openness to public scrutiny of decision-making, processes, and actions.
Transparency helps to demonstrate respect for persons and contributes to trustworthiness.
Trustworthiness Trustworthiness is the property of being worthy of trust. It is a value that applies not only to
individuals, organisations, governments, and institutions, but also to data, evidence, and
systems. It can manifest procedurally as being transparent and truthful, reliable and
consistent, or dependable.
246 Asian Bioethics Review (2019) 11:227–254
compromising or privileging one value over another, and to ensure that harms poten-
tially arising from the chosen action are considered carefully and minimised to the
greatest extent possible.
Broadly speaking, the case studies in the domain papers apply a process of
reasoning that has been adapted from systematic, procedural approaches to ethical
decision-making used by a variety of scholars and practitioners in healthcare
ethics.11 While there are numerous step-by-step approaches depending on the area
and the structure of the framework in question, some more extensive than others, we
have adopted the following steps for the purposes of this Framework (represented in
Diagram 1):
1. Identify and clearly articulate the presumptive ethical issue or problem at hand
2. Identify the relevant values pertinent to the issue or problem (from the list of 16
key ethical values, noting, as previously stated, that this may not be an exhaustive
list). This is a two-step process as procedural and substantive values need to be
identified (see Diagram 1)
3. Identify potential actions (including consideration of policies, legal issues) that
could be taken in response
4. In light of the values and context, weigh up the relative ethical merit of the different
options
5. Select the option that has the strongest ethical weight attached to it and reflect on
how your personal or the group’s position and interests have influenced the
decision, noting that the decision may require further consideration
6. Communicate the decision transparently to all stakeholders.
We have previously indicated that overarching considerations include our moral
attitude towards persons and groups (respect for persons), the need to make decisions
that cohere with community expectations (social licence), and the need to ensure that
research or activities using big data mitigate vulnerabilities rather than creating or
exacerbating them. Considerations of social licence and efforts to alleviate and not
exacerbate vulnerabilities also work towards promoting respect for persons and groups
so we see that the moral attitude we have towards others is central to the whole
decision-making process.
These three overarching considerations assist in identifying some of the values
we need to consider in each case but there is likely to be an iterative process in
steps 1, 2, and 3 in order to fully identify all the relevant issues and values. Also
assisting in identifying the relevant values is the specific issue/problem and the
context within which it arises. When we begin to consider some possible solutions,
it is likely that additional values will become obvious and will lead us to continue
to consider the specific solution, amend it, or discard it, as a result of the
deliberative process.
The resolution of conflicts between values in step 4 is arguably the most difficult
aspect of any ethical decision-making framework and it is difficult to articulate a
single process for balancing conflicting values, particularly outside a specific
11 See, for example, WRHA Ethics Services 2015, Kerridge et al. 2013, and Velasquez et al. 2015.
Asian Bioethics Review (2019) 11:227–254 247
context. Deliberative balancing is the process we engage in when trying to deter-
mine and justify which value carries greater weight than another relevant value in a
particular case (Demarco and Ford 2006). The justifications and reasoning provided
for considering one value to hold greater importance than another help promote and
further moral debate and provide a clear basis on which decisions have been
reached (Demarco and Ford 2006).
Robustly justified conclusions result from the use of such step-by-step decision-
making processes, which make it less likely that stakeholders will overlook relevant
values and considerations. This step-by-step process also has the advantage of being
able to proceed with pragmatic analysis and discussion concerning ethical issues in big
data without becoming bogged down in theoretical disputes. As previously noted, key
requirements in this deliberative balancing and weighing process are deep insight,
reflection, sound judgement, and acknowledgment and tolerance of uncertainty, all
features of personal and general wisdom.
This structured step-by-step process eschews any particular approach to determining
the best course of action, as may be found in utilitarian, libertarian, or human rights
theories. While such theories may have the advantage of being able to produce definite
answers with less critical reflection, they are each contentious. Ethical decision-making
frameworks, instead, rely on values with some degree of commonality between
different systematic theories (Beauchamp and Childress 2013). This has the procedural
advantage of being more likely to be acceptable among stakeholders with a variety of
background ethical commitments.
Taking the values, the broader overarching considerations, and the step-by-step
decision-making process together, this Framework provides decision-makers with a
means to engage explicitly with what is at stake in a given big data context; it provides
a common language with which to interact with other decision-makers and
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Diagram 1 Deliberative balancing approach to decision-making in big data contexts
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stakeholders; it offers a process for thinking through specific decisions relative to the
values and, importantly, for justifying final outcomes, and thereby supporting more
robust ethical decision-making in the realm of big data.
Explicit articulation of the steps above is exemplified in the first of the domain
papers (Xafis and Labude 2019) presented in this Special Issue. In the remaining
domain papers, the issues are worked through using this approach but the steps are
not always as overtly articulated. As discussed earlier, the present Framework is meant
to assist stakeholders in making judgements and determinations for themselves, in a
systematic way irrespective of their worldview. As previously noted, the domain papers
achieve this by outlining the issues and values in the context of the particular domain
and using specific cases and examples to work through the identified issues and values
in a more concrete way.
Feedback Cycles
This project and the formation of the Working Group was initiated by the Science,
Health and Policy-relevant Ethics in Singapore (SHAPES) Initiative, Centre for
Biomedical Ethics (CBmE), National University of Singapore (NUS). The SHAPES
conference ‘Ethics of Big Data in Health and Research’ was held on 30 Nov–1
Dec 2018 and was supported by the Clinical Ethics Network + Research Ethics
Support Programme, CBmE, NUS.
This conference provided the opportunity for the first round of expert feedback.
SHAPES introduced an innovative feedback loop at the conference, which was
attended by experts in the field, clinician researchers, and government officials with
an interest in big data. Following each domain presentation and discussion, attendees
were asked to provide written feedback in relation to key issues the respective domain
should discuss or any points they felt were important to note. This detailed feedback
about the domains and the Framework as a whole was subsequently incorporated into
the draft Framework document and the individual domain papers.
Table 3 Expert feedback and commentary on the Framework
Reviewer Affiliation
Dr Florencia Luna Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (Latin American School of Social
Sciences), Argentina
Professor Mark Taylor Deputy Director of HeLEX@Melbourne, University of Melbourne, Australia
Professor Patrick Tan Director, Duke-NUS Genome Biology Facility, Duke-NUS Medical School,
Singapore
Assistant Professor SIM
Xueling
Saw Swee Hock School of Public Health, National University of Singapore,
Singapore
Dr Nayha Sethi Chancellor’s Fellow, Mason Institute, University of Edinburgh, UK
Dr Sarah Chan Reader/Chancellor’s Fellow, Usher Institute of Population Health Sciences and
Informatics, University of Edinburgh, UK
Professor Kenneth
Goodman
Director, Institute for Bioethics and Health Policy; School of Medicine, University
of Miami, USA
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The draft Framework and individual domains were then reviewed by the
whole SHAPES Working Group and were subsequently sent to experts from
a variety of specialty fields for further comment (Table 3). The SHAPES
Working Group greatly appreciates the thoughtful feedback provided and
acknowledges that it contributed to an improved articulation of the Frame-
work and domain papers.
Following the expert feedback cycle, the SHAPES Working Group and the
SHAPES team incorporated the feedback into the Framework, which was further
reviewed by the whole SHAPES Working Group.
Conclusion
The Framework presented in this paper identified 16 substantive and proce-
dural values the SHAPES Working Group deemed relevant to numerous big
data domains. While not exhaustive, the articulation of these values has the
potential to elucidate important considerations in big data research and health
activities. The Framework also highlighted three general issues that cut across
all decision-making in big data contexts: respect for persons, social licence,
and vulnerability and power. We presented a step-by-step deliberative process
and clarified how relevant values can be identified. While decision-making
frameworks cannot provide definitive guidance on how to balance conflicting
values, this Framework points to issues which contribute to such balancing and
articulates how a careful deliberative process can offer more robust justifica-
tions for decisions made in the intricate big data landscape. Examples of how
users can work through a number of issues in different big data domains are
provided in the individual domain papers which form part of this Framework.
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